Research & Debate: Prediction by Hughes, Wayne P., Jr.
Naval War College Review 
Volume 73 
Number 1 Winter 2020 Article 8 
2020 
Research & Debate: Prediction 
Wayne P. Hughes Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
Hughes, Wayne P. Jr. (2020) "Research & Debate: Prediction," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , 
Article 8. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
RESEARCH & DEBATE
PREDICTION
Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
The predictive power of experts, operations analysis, and the value of infor-
mation are interwoven subjects that are hard to winnow down to an essence� 
Prediction is a big subject, so I have limited this article to what I know best: the 
operational and tactical domains of conventional warfare�
First you will read three examples of limitations of predictions when they 
are formed on the basis of information alone� Next I will demonstrate that even 
a modest amount of quantitative analysis, even with incomplete information, 
can help a decision maker execute a military campaign without making explicit 
predictions about the coming battles or operations� Analysts cannot eliminate 
wartime surprises, but they can help to avoid the worst mistakes and steer 
military leaders toward better decisions� I will conclude by advocating what 
is too rarely done: the comparison of quantitative campaign analysis done be-
fore a war with what actually transpired in the war, to show that useful—even 
critically important—advice can be formulated very quickly to help decision 
makers� On one hand, intense thinking about 
the war is necessary; on the other hand, expert 
judgment alone should be augmented with 
simple, transparent, timely—even if incomplete— 
quantitative analysis�
PREDICTION FROM INFORMATION ONLY
Black Swans
Surely the most drastic book on prediction is N� N� 
Taleb’s The Black Swan, subtitled The Impact of the 
Highly Improbable. Taleb makes an entertaining 
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case for the occurrence of unforeseeable events and the like, but his advice is pret-
ty trite; since, by definition, a black swan cannot be predicted, the most we can do 
is be ready for surprises, and then be responsive and adaptive when they occur�1
Gray Swans
More interesting are what might be called gray swans: surprising events of great 
consequence for which evidence existed beforehand but was lost in a clutter of 
information� In the commercial sector, the recent burst of the housing bubble is 
the latest of many collapses brought on by “the madness of crowds” whose herd 
instinct overcame many clues of excesses in plain sight�2 Gray swans in the mili-
tary domain are exemplified by the invasion of South Korea in 1950, the collapse 
of Soviet control in 1989, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990� All three 
illustrate “surprises” that Monday-morning quarterbacks have decried� After the 
debacle at Pearl Harbor was described alternatively as resulting from a nefarious 
plot or the careless handling of information, Roberta Wohlstetter wrote what is, 
to me, the definitive interpretation in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.3 At 
the strategic intelligence level, she shows that it was easy to miss the clues of what 
turned into a tactical disaster amid information overload� At the emotional level, 
one must see the need to hedge against human shortcomings in predicting future 
wars, while being careful not to cry wolf too often�
Gray swans are complicated by the fact that an enemy frequently will use 
deception to ensure they are gray, so to speak� In part Japan was successful in 
its Pearl Harbor attack because it employed deception to achieve surprise� I will 
refer later to Barton Whaley’s masterful study of strategic deception, but here I 
will mention an equally valuable source: the recent book by Erik Dahl, Intelligence 
and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.4 
Dahl is particularly insightful because he goes beyond deception in big wars to 
include deceptions that terrorists use to attempt to achieve surprise�
Expert Political Judgment
What, then, about predictions by experts? A marvelous book by Philip E� Tet-
lock first describes finding 284 self-proclaimed authorities who made a living 
commenting on political, international, or economic trends and were willing to 
participate in his study� Tetlock’s questions were the kind that could be answered 
“better,” “worse,” or “about the same�” Over several years in the 1990s Tetlock ac-
cumulated 82,361 answers in his database� In 2003, Tetlock compared the predic-
tions with actual results� Two years later he published his conclusions in a book 
entitled Expert Political Judgment.5
And the envelope, please� Well, it is a fat envelope, because Tetlock gives all the 
interested parties a nuanced hearing� To summarize his findings, I quote from a 
New Yorker book review: “[t]he experts performed worse than they would have if 
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they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes� � � � Human 
beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world are poorer forecast-
ers than a dart-throwing monkey�”6 Worse still, the experts tried to defend their 
wrong predictions with excuses such as “My timing was off ” or “An unforesee-
able event interfered with what should have happened�” Tetlock also shows that 
nonexperts who answered the same questions did better than the dart-throwing 
monkey� Not a lot better—but significantly more so than the experts�
INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTED BY ANALYSIS
These are examples of predictability on the basis of information only� Tetlock’s 
Expert Political Judgment is full of statistics measuring the performance of ex-
perts, but as far as I know the experts did not do any analysis to supplement their 
opinions� So, let us next make a distinction between information-based predic-
tion alone and decision-making that is assisted by a quantitative assessment�
Why Military Analysis Cannot Predict
As we begin the shift to military operations analysis, I refer to an essay by the late, 
great Air Force analyst Clayton Thomas�7 In effect, he described model-based 
analysis as an if-then statement� Two things—the model and its inputs—are on 
the if side; model and inputs together are processed to yield a result—the then 
side� If the model represented reality—which in campaign analysis it cannot—
and if the data were precise—and in warfare the data are always “dirty” with 
errors—then the result would be an accurate prediction� We military analysts 
make no such claims; we say no more for the results than that when they are used 
wisely insightful conclusions can be reached and better decisions made�
Prediction Is Sometimes Unavoidable
Although generally we do not claim to predict outcomes, sometimes a decision 
maker must do just that, and we must help him� A prominent example is the 
procurement of warships and aircraft that are intended to have thirty- or even 
forty-year service lives� To see the impossibility of getting the designs right, no 
matter how comprehensive the analysis may be, reflect on the state of the world 
in 1979 and all that has changed since then that affects the prospective wartime 
performance of those ships today�
Space permitting, I could write at length, first, about how our warships com-
pleted before 1979 were designed earlier to carry technologies that were earlier 
still; second, that expensive, multipurpose ships are a poor way to hedge against 
future gray swans; and third, that we have not had to fight a fleet battle since 1945� 
All our learning about war at sea in the missile age has been vicarious, except for 
the handful of embarrassing single-ship attacks we have suffered�
3
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Analytical methods and predictive power vary with tactics, technologies, and 
testing and with whether the predictions concern policy, operations, logistics, 
procurements, or strategies� A fine book on the subject is the Military Operations 
Research Society’s Military Modeling for Decision Making, because it is compre-
hensive in distinguishing modeling and techniques for different defense-related 
purposes�8
Strategic Planning and Force Procurement
An accurate, recent, thirty-eight-page appraisal of predictive power when aided 
by extensive, even exhaustive, analysis was published in October 2011 by the 
distinguished statesman Richard Danzig�9 Quoting liberally from both Taleb and 
Tetlock, Danzig shows the limits of model-assisted planning and why the limits 
have been inevitable when programming weapon systems for the future� His cure 
is difficult to implement, however, because Danzig argues, in black swan fashion, 
for more-nimble Department of Defense and congressional processes and accep-
tance of something less than the perfection demanded by those in government 
who metaphorically dodge and weave in a defensive crouch�
In one respect, Danzig’s advice seems implementable� He recommends that we 
work on simpler systems that can be designed and produced more quickly and be 
discarded after shorter lifetimes, when geopolitical circumstances change or new 
technologies serve up either threats or opportunities� Although Danzig does not 
say it this way, the implication is that top-down solutions are unavoidable when 
expensive, long-lived systems must fill capability niches that will endure for the 
long haul—for example, multifunction orbiting satellites, or ballistic-missile-
carrying submarines armed with “failure proof ” nuclear weapons for strategic 
deterrence� Otherwise, bottom-up, quickly deliverable, relatively inexpensive 
systems that fill immediate needs—sometimes by short-circuiting the procure-
ment bureaucracy—are the way to recover from failures of prediction in strategic 
planning� An example is the recent, rapid development of unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, both in the large quantities deployed and in the many design variations� 
Falling somewhere in between were the successes at Kelly Johnson’s Lockheed 
Skunk Works, which responded quickly—from the U-2 in 1955 to the SR-71 in 
1966—to fill a need for long-range surveillance aircraft perceived at the highest 
levels of the Central Intelligence Agency�
Strategic Deception in Wartime
Barton Whaley’s Stratagem is a good, quantitative book on methods of deception 
to achieve strategic surprise, how many false clues it takes to achieve it, how to 
enhance your chances of success, and why attempts to deceive have not cost much 
in resources�10 He gives historical examples, such as the strategic surprise the 
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Germans achieved in 1941 when they invaded the Soviet Union and what the Al-
lies achieved in the Normandy invasion� Whaley tells the deceiver how to succeed 
and the rewards that ensue� He shows that the victims of strategic deception be-
have much like Tetlock’s experts, who were blinded by their own overconfidence�
Tactics, Technology, and Testing
The measured performance predictions in peacetime exercises become caught up 
in the fog of war� Jon Sumida observes that before World War I the Royal Navy 
expected a hitting rate of 30 percent with the fleet’s big guns�11 But in the Battle 
of Jutland the Germans achieved a rate of about 4 percent and the British 3�5 
percent�12 There were good reasons for the diminished performance at Jutland, 
but that is the point about prediction: there are always going to be ex post facto 
reasons your peacetime expectations will be wrong� The English operations ana-
lyst David Rowland has devoted much of his career to comparing ground combat 
exercise data with wartime data from similar battles� In one of his early papers 
he compares results from laser-instrumented, nonlethal training exercises with 
actual combat results in similar environments during World War II� The predic-
tions based on the exercises overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks 
by a factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry ac-
tions by a factor of seven! Yes, a sevenfold overestimation of soldier performance� 
In effect, Rowland confirms S� L� A� Marshall’s highly controversial conclusions 
about the small number of American soldiers who fired their weapons when 
under fire in World War II�
One of the most famous model-based predictions—I think prediction is the 
apt word—was by Frederick W� Lanchester, who claimed that the square law phe-
nomenon would apply to air-to-air combat�13 He wished to show the advantage 
of numbers over quality in a new age of air warfare� But Lanchester was wrong� 
From evidence reported by Philip Morse and George Kimball in their famous 
Methods of Operations Research and in more-detailed recent analysis by Niall 
MacKay, we know that through World War II the linear law applied in the air�14 
What Lanchester failed to see was that air combat essentially consists of duels, in 
the form of dogfights or ambushes, so the square law assumptions are not met� 
This was no theoretical matter� As MacKay shows, the top Royal Air Force leaders 
in the Battle of Britain argued between massing defending fighters—in Lanches-
ter square law fashion—and getting the fighters in the air as swiftly as possible, 
so that small detachments were in the best position to win duels between single 
aircraft� I also tell our students of campaign analysis that the greatest number of 
kills often does not come from air-to-air combat� If they want to anticipate—to 
predict, as it were—which side will achieve air superiority, they must make a 
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difficult estimate of how successful each side’s attempt will be to attack aircraft on 
the ground, the way the Japanese surprised and destroyed MacArthur’s air force 
in the Philippines immediately after Pearl Harbor�
Lest you think we are better off now, with modern computers and power-
ful algorithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example� The 
U�S� Navy depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system� 
Using data from controlled experiments at sea, one might conclude that if you 
shoot two surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at an incoming antiship cruise missile 
(ASCM), and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 
90 percent or more of the attacking ASCMs� What is the combat record? In 
battles at sea, warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success 
in defending themselves from ASCMs� But all the successes must be attributed 
to soft-kill and point-defense weapons, not to SAMs� There are also several in-
stances of warships that might have defended themselves but did not, illustrated 
by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli warship Hanit� Navy officers 
also will remember the Exocet hits on USS Stark and HMS Sheffield, which might 
have defended themselves with surface-to-air missiles but did not� In the entire 
record, starting in 1967, of more than 220 missiles fired on ships at sea, only one 
antiship missile has been shot down by a SAM� The record of USN missile ships 
in combat is zero for two, if one counts the action of USS Vincennes in shooting 
down an Iranian airliner as a failure� As at Jutland, a careful examination of these 
missile-era events shows there were reasons for the wartime results—pretty good 
reasons, too—but the important conclusion is that the fog of war almost always 
makes peacetime predictions too optimistic� Wartime surprises, although not 
exactly black swans, always will be present�
OUR PRODUCT IS USEFUL INSIGHT
Now I am going to focus on the domain of gray swans when our tools are used for 
operational and tactical predictions� I will show that even though the predictive 
power of our analyses is less than we would wish, if we focus on the right objec-
tives and use appropriate measures of effectiveness our results and recommenda-
tions will be a powerful aid to decision makers� Indeed, I am going to arrive at 
conclusions so cheerful they may surprise you�
Campaign Analysis
Campaign analysis is hard to do, and its predictive power is very much a mat-
ter of how demanding you want to be� For example, between the world wars the 
Naval War College played over three hundred games, most at the campaign level 
and most against Japan� They were highly valuable because they sobered our 
early optimism about the war’s most important elements� After the war, Admiral 
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Chester Nimitz wrote a famous letter saying that, except for kamikazes, the 
games had anticipated its major events accurately—referring, I suppose, to what 
happened in the drive through the Central Pacific that he oversaw� On the other 
hand, the Guadalcanal campaign, the shift from a battleship-centric force to a 
carrier-centric force, the vital contribution of American code breaking, and the 
drive by MacArthur up the New Guinea coast were vital aspects about which the 
games afforded no clues� In fact, after Pearl Harbor every class of warship except 
minesweepers changed its function�
At the tactical level, even the postmortems do not do justice to two factors that 
some operations analysis might have revealed� Looking back at the Battle of Mid-
way of June 1942, historians recognized four things that were necessary for the 
Americans to overcome a numerical inferiority of seventy-five ships to twenty- 
five: code breaking; brilliant leadership by Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance; great 
courage in our naval aviators; and just plain good luck� But they missed two oth-
ers� Until recently, no historian had picked up on the value of radar� If the Japa-
nese ships had had our air-search radar, our surprise dive-bomber attack could 
not have succeeded�15 Nor has any historian I have read identified the key role 
of Midway Island itself, which served as an immobile fourth American aircraft 
carrier, drawing away Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s attention and firepower at the 
critical time�16
And yet, and yet: war games and fleet exercises schooled our carrier com-
manders before the Pacific War to know that the best way to win—and the only 
way, if outnumbered—was to detect the enemy first and get off a decisive first 
strike with every aircraft you had� Simple but elegant salvo equations, not yet 
invented in 1942, would match the results and “predict” with sufficient quantita-
tive accuracy the outcomes of all five of the big carrier battles in the Pacific ex 
post facto�17
Having in mind, then, that both Admiral Nimitz and the Midway historians 
ought to be given some slack, I will now describe three remarkable examples 
of the power and utility of our methods applied to campaigns, to show how 
analyses can help military leaders make better decisions and avoid the worst 
blunders� The examples are entertaining because they were performed by our 
young officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in a course on 
joint campaign analysis� The students had to reach their conclusions very quickly, 
with maximum professional knowledge and minimum computation, because the 
class pretense—a realistic one—was that their decision maker needed their inputs 
within about seventy-two hours� In these “ministudies,” the students did not have 
time to construct a detailed, realistic simulation�
7
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Foresight and Hindsight in Wars
The Falkland Islands War. In the first example, the students fought the Falklands 
War on paper in 1982 before it started� They had no inkling that General Bel-
grano was about to be sunk, taking the Argentine surface navy out of the war; or 
that Exocet missiles would be highly effective in destroying British ships; or that 
Argentine ground forces in the Falklands would be thoroughly outclassed� To do 
justice to their insightful work would take several paragraphs, but I can report the 
bottom line very quickly�
Neither side that fought had done such an analysis—early, fast, and basic� I 
believed then, and still do, that if they had the Argentine junta would have won 
the war, and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher would have been more 
cautious about sailing forty-two ships—essentially committing the United King-
dom to take back the Falklands� Why? Because the focused campaign analysis by 
the students showed that, with only a little foresight, the Argentine air force—all 
140 fighter/attack aircraft, flown by capable pilots—could have staged through 
Stanley airfield on East Falkland Island� It did not take a detailed model or pre-
cise inputs to conclude that those aircraft, even when dropping iron bombs the 
old-fashioned way, would have penetrated the twenty-two Harriers and other air 
defenses and put enough British ships out of action to force the fleet to abandon 
the invasion�
Operation DESERT SHIELD. While my class was meeting in the fall of 1990, a big 
debate was raging over whether the United States and our Middle East partners 
could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait without a ground campaign� At the 
time, many American members of Congress and pundits were arguing that this 
was possible�
The charge to my students was to do a fast-turnaround ministudy to deter-
mine whether there was an operation other than an invasion of Kuwait that 
would persuade Saddam Hussein to leave� After doing as much quantitative as-
sessment as time permitted, the students concluded that if we wanted him out of 
Kuwait we would have to attack on the ground� This seems obvious in hindsight 
now, but it was not so when the students made their appraisal�
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Lastly, I report on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)� 
This student appraisal was done even faster than a ministudy—over a single 
weekend� We asked the students how long it would take to win the war� Astutely 
they asked, “What do you mean by ‘win the war’?” Together we agreed that get-
ting to Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussein would constitute victory! I still 
think that was a suitably specific analysis goal, because everything after that 
comprised peacemaking operations—long and difficult though they turned out 
to be�
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Four student teams each made independent estimates� One team said it would 
take four weeks; one team said two to four weeks; one team said two weeks to 
get there, but that they did not know how long the city fighting would last; and 
the last team said three weeks� As it transpired, it took three weeks and a day to 
overthrow the regime� What our students could not predict, of course, was that a 
sandstorm would slow the advance, and that some elite soldiers operating inside 
Baghdad would enjoy such luck and display such courage�
But the students had some crib notes to help them make their estimates� They 
knew that research, most notably by the Army analyst Bob Helmbold, had con-
cluded that the rate of advance of an army unopposed or against light opposition 
has been and still is about twenty-five miles a day� The students could scale back 
the movement rate appropriately in making their estimates—predictions, as it 
were� In actuality, our soldiers and Marines advanced the three hundred miles to 
Baghdad in three weeks—a rate of fifteen miles per day�
OTHER DOMAINS
I have emphasized the rewards and limitations of operational and tactical analysis 
to prepare for war� There is a lot more to the story� Before summing up, here is a 
brief contrast with two other domains of prediction�
Attenuating Terrorist Attacks
I am not well informed on what kind of analysis would best supplement experi-
ence in fighting the perpetual war against terrorists� But I have read a fine paper 
entitled “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Ana-
lysts�” It is a warning against a methodology that cannot help and might hinder 
prediction and planning for homeland defense�18
Authors Jerry Brown and Tony Cox see two problems with the methodol-
ogy� One danger is to put confidence in the predictions of experts that are in 
fact inputs to the analytical scheme� They are suspicious of expert opinion, as 
am I� The other problem is adapting a methodology—probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA)—that has been effective for engineering analysis but is essentially 
a decision-theory way to design against adverse natural events and risks� The 
authors point out that when the enemy is not nature but an attacker who wants 
to outwit us and penetrate our defenses, then PRA actually can help the enemy� 
The proper mind-set is game theory, which says that we must do the best we can 
against the best he can do� The PRA methodology comes no closer to examin-
ing enemy choices and capabilities than to ask an expert the “probability of an 
attack”—without regard for what the enemy observes us doing�
There is wide agreement that a new attack against our homeland will come 
someday� Predicting where and against what target is the hard part that the PRA 
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method cannot illuminate� Brown and Cox recommend shifting the emphasis 
of risk management from using experts to guess where risk might be greatest to 
calculating where targeted investments will most improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructures� This entails more attention to two things: First, install additional 
safeguards where they have the biggest payoff—for example, by adding some 
“inefficient” redundancies to our excessively “efficient” but vulnerable electrical- 
distribution system, as well as the grids that distribute trains, trucks, petroleum, 
and communications� Second, establish and practice procedures to recover after 
an attack—for example, on the large containerport at Long Beach or the San 
Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge� Perhaps we have improved disaster recovery 
since the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, but from the natural disasters of 
which I am aware, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, 
and also from an NPS-conducted experiment in intergovernmental cooperation 
in San Diego, preparing to act after an attack may be more productive than trying 
to prevent every attack� It is likely that the two best ways to recover more quickly 
are by conducting inexpensive drills to improve coordination among many agen-
cies and levels of government, and by ensuring readiness to employ emergency 
modes of communication� The general rule is “when there’s a war on, study the 
war�” That applies to the war on terrorists, to the frequent use of unmanned ve-
hicles in peacetime, and to the unending competition to safeguard and exploit 
cyberspace�
Measuring Influence to Avoid War
The object of the Cold War was to exert American influence without fighting the 
Soviet Union� We never could measure past success in predicting outcomes of 
our campaigns, including a highly predictable world disaster from a nuclear ex-
change, because there was no war to study� The paradox is that the only available 
measures of the success of the analyses and the predictions resulting therefrom 
were that, year by year, deterrence held�
As far as I know, during the long Cold War there was only one attempt to 
measure the predictive power of the many campaign analyses of a hot war� It 
occurred because an inspired analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
persuaded the CNA president to refight, on paper, a study that his think tank 
had conducted for the Navy in 1965, of a war at sea conducted ten years later� A 
study assumption was that the nuclear threshold would not be breached, in part 
because the American strategy was to confine the war to the oceans� The war 
was bloody enough among the combatants, but massive civilian casualties were 
avoided� Around 1976 (I am citing from memory) the analysis was repeated with 
the same military objectives, but with the geopolitical environment updated, re-
sulting in somewhat heavier demands on NATO forces, principally those of the 
10
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U�S� Navy� In 1976, Soviet forces were slightly greater than had been projected in 
1965; our estimates of Soviet maritime combat capabilities were about the same� 
On the other hand, between 1965 and 1976 the American fleet had become much 
smaller, and future combat capabilities projected to be in the fleet in 1976 had not 
lived up to technical expectations when actually deployed� Thus, all inputs for the 
repeat campaign analysis seemed to indicate a worse outcome� Yet the outcome 
of the campaign “fought” on paper in 1976 was amazingly about the same as in 
the 1965 study, and perhaps a little bit better� The reason was that in two or three 
instances after the new systems built in 1965 were deployed, new tactics were 
conceived and developed to fight with them more effectively� Better tactics more 
than offset technological disappointments and our smaller fleet�
But that interesting finding is peripheral to the two main points� First, it is 
highly useful to test our tactical and campaign analyses when their inputs and 
assumptions can be tested, yet it hardly ever is done� Second, the study results—
even in 1965, and despite their flaws—were decisively instructive� The purpose of 
the study was to test whether a war against the Soviet navy limited to the sea was 
attractive for NATO� The answer was no� That was the conclusion of overarch-
ing importance� As with the Falkland Islands scenario, it did not take exquisitely 
detailed analysis to see why—after the analysis had been done� The Soviet Union 
was a continental power that did not depend fundamentally on the oceans, but 
NATO was a maritime alliance for which control of the Atlantic was essential� 
The Soviets had too little at risk and NATO too much risk to make the threat of 
a war at sea an effective deterrent� No more was heard of it� NATO continued, 
wisely, to believe the central front in Europe was the critical region of interest�
There is a modern analogy to the war at sea, as we contemplate ways to influ-
ence China, keep faith with friendly states in Asia, and avoid a big and economi-
cally disastrous war� Far from being unwise, analysis of a war-at-sea strategy in 
the western Pacific looks feasible and desirable because, unlike that of the Soviet 
Union, Chinese prosperity depends on the sea� Unlike the Soviet state, China has 
begun to build a fleet that can protect the movement of its shipping in the open 
ocean, while shifting from a sea-denial to a sea-control navy�
A brilliant recent article by Naval War College professors Toshi Yoshihara and 
James Holmes points out that one cannot construct a strategy unless its ends, 
ways, and means are well defined� Hence the state—namely, China—must be 
identified as the strategy’s object�19 The ends almost have been established, be-
cause the Secretary of State and others have indicated our intention to put more 
emphasis on the western Pacific� In effect, our policy experts have made a predic-
tion about the future� Next must come an analysis of the best ways to sustain our 
influence there at an affordable cost� Yoshihara and Holmes describe the limits 
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of the Air-Sea Battle concept and suggest other actions at sea that can and should 
precede strikes on mainland China� U�S� and allied navy components should try 
to keep the war at sea, exploit American maritime strengths, and demonstrate 
that China has the most to lose at every level of escalation—from maritime 
interdiction short of a full blockade all the way up to sinking Chinese warships 
and commercial vessels with American submarines in their home seas� Once we 
have in hand the ways to constrain every kind of confrontation, next comes fur-
ther campaign analysis, testing, and negotiation with allies and partners in Asia� 
We must ascertain the means: the types and numbers of forces to execute such 
a flexible strategy that also fits the desires of China’s neighbors and worldwide 
commercial interests�
The same fleet must be suitable in times of cooperation, competition, confron-
tation, or conflict, and China has a say in what our ends must be� If all our ships 
are expected to have thirty- and forty-year service lives, the challenge will be to 
construct one long-lived fleet for all circumstances� We do not yet know whether 
Yoshihara and Holmes are right about the ways and means, but analysis to meet 
various conditions, not a prediction of a single future, is the way to find out�
WHAT TO BELIEVE ABOUT PREDICTION
Black swans exist� Unavoidable surprises will continue� Black swans do not have 
to be deceptive, because, by definition, their surprise cannot be predicted�
Gray swans in the military world are complicated because they are concealed 
by a perverse enemy who wants to surprise us� Pearl Harbor happened not just 
because it was an unlikely event and the clues about the attack were mishandled 
but also because a clever enemy was doing his utmost to surprise us�
Regrettably, gray swans are not likely to become rarer� The growth of knowl-
edge, illustrated by the replacement of a written Encyclopaedia Britannica with 
the electronic Wikipedia, exceeds our capacity to sort the information quickly� 
And in fast-moving military operations the enemy will be trying constantly to 
throw sand in our eyes�
Expert judgment for national policy and military strategy is unreliable unless 
it is substantiated with the quantitative methods of operations research� Critical 
decisions can be greatly—even decisively—enhanced by quantitative analysis, 
notwithstanding that a decision maker’s prewar conclusions will fall well short 
of—and should never claim to be—a prediction of the future� Useful insights 
come from wise application of dirty data processed in an appropriately simple 
model to yield results that are at once precise, inaccurate, and helpful�
The Falklands War seventy-two-hour analysis by our campaign analysis stu-
dents illustrates how decisive macro insights can be discerned in a very short 
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time� Despite limited knowledge of how a war will unfold, quantitative analysis is 
powerful for uncovering the essential features of good and bad choices�
The students’ overnight analysis ahead of OIF showed two different things� On 
one hand, the analysis demonstrated that an amazingly accurate estimate of how 
long it would take to overthrow the Hussein regime could be made swiftly� On 
the other hand, analytical power did not help anticipate that after toppling the 
regime there would be a very long aftermath of difficult peacemaking� It is not 
new news that the enemy gets a vote, and sometimes his choice will seem not to 
be in his own best interests�
Accurate predictions are useless if they are too late to help the decision maker� 
If he or she must act in seventy-two hours, we must help him within seventy-two 
hours� Our students follow the one-third, one-third, one-third rule of analysis� 
Given three days to complete the work, spend the first day figuring out how 
quantitative analysis can best help him make his decision; do the analysis on the 
next day; and take the third day to recover from your mistakes, answer his ques-
tions, or enrich the work�
There are many variations of conflict in which military operations analysis 
can supplement professional knowledge profitably� One is when the campaign 
goes on endlessly; this allows time to gather “combat” data, assess it, and apply 
it—while remembering that the enemy also is observing and adapting� Another 
is when the object is not to prepare for war but to adapt new ends, ways, and 
means to prevent war by retaining influence over a prospective enemy in chang-
ing circumstances� Then the goal of analysis is to help decide what strategy and 
capabilities will be the best ones to keep the peace or to contain the war at a low 
level of violence�
A paradigm of all prediction is the if-then statement, with two parts to the 
if side� To the extent that a model describes the circumstances and the data are 
accurate, the analysis process will give accurate results� When the model is a sim-
plification (an artful one, we hope) and the data are dirty (but good enough, we 
hope), then the goal is not to predict the outcome but to help a decision maker do 
the best he can after adding his own wisdom to our quantitative analysis�
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